The Unravelling of Myanmar’s “Transition Democracy”
These past few days have been a roller coaster ride of emotions and anxiety with the current events in Myanmar. It is very difficult to imagine the feelings of the Myanmar people when they heard the news of the coup in the early morning of February 1, 2021.
I came to Myanmar for the first time in 2014 to do a week-long training on community disaster risk reduction for a group of 15 local NGOs in the country. Community programs on disaster prevention and preparedness started the many community development programs in Myanmar. The aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the mismanagement of the disaster response, prompted the junta to ease up restrictions in Myanmar for the UN and several international aid agencies to come in respond to the disaster that severely affected 1.5million people including an estimated 100,000 deaths.
That week in 2014, I spent 4 days in Yangon and 3 days in the town of Pyapon in the Ayeyarwaddy Region, lower Myanmar. My first impression upon arriving in Yangon was just unexpected because of the “manicured” parks around Inya Lake and the People’s Park in front of the massive Shwedagon Pagoda that seats in the middle of Yangon. It was surreal as unlike the many cities in Asia I visited, Yangon is not busy with the traffic of motorbikes. Men still wear their longyis and women have their faces adorned with thanaka powder. The Internet back then was sparse and limited only to the hotel WiFi. There is only one or two mobile phone networks and Internet providers run by the government and SIM cards were sold at $600–700 apiece. In Pyapon township where I stayed for the next 3 days, we went out visiting a small village surrounded by crisscrossing rivers and streams, where people are still recovering from the impact of Cyclone Nargis.
I have been working in the development sector for more than 20 years now. I have spent half of that in my home region in Mindanao, the Philippines where it has its share of decades-old conflict along economic, cultural, and religious divides issues that are familiar too in the Myanmar context. I immediately had this feeling in 2014 that Myanmar people have a genuine desire to move past the dark times and leap towards prosperity and progress. For the years I have interacted with the Myanmar villagers — the truth is the people in Myanmar share the same dreams as are the people in the Philippines and that is to get out of poverty, provide a bright future for the next generation in a free and democratic society.
Since then, I have committed my work to Myanmar — starting the country program, learning along the way, making friends, building networks and allies, understanding the context, and implementing community projects in the rural communities in the country.
I consider myself as sideline witness to the process of democratization of the country. While there seems to be a democracy in place — I can still feel the remnants of the years of junta-rule in the country. For instance, all foreign and local visitors to a place are still required to register with the local authorities, a travel permit is even required before travel in some places. The Internet can still be unilaterally disconnected like what has happened in Rakhine, the world’s longest Internet blackout. This appearance of democracy and economic liberalization is demonstrated by the sudden increase of Internet penetration which is now 40% of the population are connected to the Internet, massive infrastructure developments in Yangon and continued increase tourist traffic — but that is what it is, just an appearance of democracy and liberalization.
When the junta transferred power to a civilian government in 2011, it was based on a “hybrid” formula for democracy. The junta formulated the Constitution in a way that still gave the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) enormous power and role in the government such as the following Constitutional provisions:
· Allocation of 25% of seats in the national parliament to be appointed by the Tatmadaw, this gave them the veto power to efforts to amend the Constitution and policy making is made by making concessions with the Tatmadaw appointed parliament members.
· The ministries of defense, home affairs (interior), and border affairs are to be headed by active members of the Tatmadaw, and that they are protected against any legislative oversight allowing the unbridled proliferation of arms and campaigns against ethnic armed groups.
· Power to appoint one of the two Vice Presidents that ensures the Tatmadaw the power to elevate their Vice President in the event of the incapacitation or absence of a civilian president and vice president. In February 1, the Tatmadaw arrested the sitting president and second Vice President. Without them, the Tatmadaw appointed vice president took the presidency which then handed power of the government to the Senior General of the Tatmadaw.
· mechanism for a “coup”, a provision allows the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council to seize power if it unilaterally declares a “state of emergency.” This was what happened on February 1, 2021
Myanmar’s journey to a democratic country has been considered a game between generals and civilian leaders, an experiment that if the generals feel that they are losing in the game, they can simply pull the plug and grab power.
Even with a “rigged” democratic system, I have witnessed key reforms that will bring Myanmar to progress. The country created a safe space for local civil societies to thrive with the passage of a revised Association Law while not the best and without criticism, it does rationalize the registration of local and international development agencies, it has made reforms in investments and businesses including the launching of the Yangon Stock Exchange, it has liberalized the Internet and communication that drive innovative business models built on mobile technologies and many more.
While these are good, a lot still needs to happen to strengthen the institutions and democratic processes — such evidence-based policymaking, strengthening local governance, structural reforms to address the issues of ethnic-based conflicts including the case of the Rohingya in Rakhine, judicial reforms and creating just and equitable investment landscape.
DASSK has been heavily vilified in the West because of her inaction on the issue of the Rohingya. The prevailing sentiment from within Myanmar is that she has no power to effect a shift in the actions of the Tatmadaw. Going against the Tatmadaw will likely tip the precarious balance of power between the two opposing forces thereby derailing the much-needed reforms to attain effective democracy and liberalization. Some sectors indicate that the inability of DASSK to strongly act on the Rohingya might also be driven along ethno-nationalistic divides in the country, another dimension unique to Myanmar political economy and society.
Understanding the event that happened on February 1, 2021, have been a topic of several articles and analysis. One explanation was the desire of the current head of the Tatmadaw, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to become president when he retires in 2021. The Tatmadaw political party, the USDP lost to a landslide victory by the NLD, the political party of DASSK. This has stopped the political ambitions of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Another explanation perhaps is the possible approval of China with the coup to advance Chinese interests in Myanmar to fast track the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, part of the global Chinese ambition, the Belt and Road Initiative. The third possible explanation of the tipping of the power balance is the role of Russia where the junta is cultivating stronger military ties to pivot away from China.
How the political and economic landscape will look like in the next 6 months will be anybody’s guess. I do think that direction of how this is going to shape will be influenced by first, the nature of the Western sanctions and the UN response as that will significantly affect investments in Tatmadaw-controlled businesses, recently 2 foreign investors have already divested their investments in these businesses. The further weakening of the Tatmadaw’s economic base will degrade the objective of the power grab which is to consolidate and strengthen its economic power and might force the Tatmadaw to re-negotiate with the NLD using whatever leverage it may still have.
Second will be how the ethnic-armed groups will eventually position themselves — will they throw their support to DASSK embattled NLD party and gamble on a possibility of the total downfall of the Tatmadaw which will advance ethnic interests for self-determination potentially to be provided by a shift to a federalist state or these ethnic armed groups will throw support to the junta in exchange for relative peace in the ethnic areas that have been ravaged by years and years of conflict with the Tatmadaw.
Third will be how the current Tatmadaw leadership will react to the protests and sanctions. The people’s protest against the coup is gaining a lot of steam everyday and its beginning to cripple vital economic activities such as banking. For the past days, the junta has been relatively calmer and accommodating. Except for the violent dispersal in Nay Pyi Daw and in Mandalay that killed 3 protesters and injured hundreds, generally the protests all over the country have been peaceful. But this remains to be seen as more and more arrests have been made every night during the imposed curfew — doctors, NLD leaders and protest leaders have been arrested without cause. This is opposite compared to the violent response in 1988 and 2007 protests. There are also signals that the Tatmadaw is trying to win the support and eventual recognition by domestic businesses and the international community. For instance, the junta promised to ease up COVID-19 restrictions so that businesses including tourism can open, the Internet blackout in Rakhine after more than 2 years have been lifted just days after the coup and the declaration that the repatriation of the Rohingya will still proceed as planned. The thousands of people and businesses participating in the ongoing “civil disobedience movement” is indicative that nobody is biting.
Whatever is the real story of the February 1 power grab and eventual outcome of the protests, what is certain is that there will be continued political. social and economic instability that will further hurt a country still reeling from the economic crisis brought by the COVID-19 pandemic. The lockdowns in 2020 have already resulted in the decline of the GDP by as much as 41%. This is driven by the shutting down of garment factories with challenges in logistics and reduced market demand in the West, a massive decline of tourism in the country as well as remittances of overseas workers who lost their jobs and repatriated back to the country — leading to a jump in unemployment and reduced incomes.
Income-based poverty has increased as a result of the slowing down of the economy. According to the studies of IFPRI, income poverty has increased from 52% to 66% in the rural areas and 29% to 59% in Yangon when the second wave of COVID-19 infection happened in September 2020. It is said now that for every five households, 3 are now earning less than $1.90/day, some even declared in the studies to have no income at all. A significant decrease in household income contributes as well to food insecurity and malnutrition for the most vulnerable populations. In some studies, mothers and households are starting to skip meals or reduce food consumption to cope with the decline in income.
A powerful call made an anonymous group of local civil society leaders to the international community to not completely cut ties with Myanmar as a result of the coup. The group said that Myanmar more than ever needs support to advance long-term transformation as well as aid to communities. Whatever is the response of the international community, should not further impact the increasing poverty, food security and suffering of the Myanmar people. The call further asks that whatever aid is delivered to the communities, be conducted by engaging local communities to find ways to adjust to an evolving operational and political context for development work in the country.
The last time I was in Yangon in my office was 12 months ago. When I come back to Yangon, it will be different with new rules and new priorities. The current situation is sad and a source of deep concern for the work I do with local NGOs and their communities, for my colleagues, friends and their families — but this is not going to change my resolve to work for the improvement of the rural communities in Myanmar.
